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MOTION TO SUPPRESS

The following is a sample of a motion to suppress. At least the meat and potatoes.  I have lots of samples. Tell me your situation and I'll explain the motion.

 FACTS

    The officer ordered the defendant out of the vehicle (at a dui checkpoint) and requested he perform a series of field sobriety tests.  Based upon the performance of these tests, the defendant was arrested for driving under the influence.

ARGUMENT      

    In Ingersoll v. Palmer (1987), 43 Cal.3d 1321, the California Supreme Court considered whether sobriety checkpoints were constitutional. The Supreme Court held that sobriety checkpoint detentions are not governed by the standard set forth in In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, "requiring an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing", and thus there does not need to be a reasonable suspicion that the detained drivers have or may be involved in criminal activity. Instead, the reasonableness of the detention is determined by balancing the societal need against the intrusion involved. Thus, where the societal interest being protected is great and the intrusion is minimal, then the detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.   Ingersoll, supra, explained that the primary purpose of a sobriety checkpoint is not to detect evidence of crime or arrest drunk drivers but to "promote public safety by deterring intoxicated persons from driving on the public streets and highways." (Id. at p. 1328).
               However, the power to randomly detain citizens is limited.  A Court must weigh the gravity of the governmental interest or public concern served, and the degree to which the program advances that concern, against the intrusiveness of the interference with individual liberty.  (Id. at p. 1321).  When balancing the societal needs against the intrusion of a number of law abiding citizens, the Ingersoll court identified eight factors to "provide functional guidelines for minimizing the intrusiveness of the sobriety checkpoint stop." (supra, at p. 1341). These factors are: (1) decision making at the supervisory level; (2) limits on discretion of field officers as to who is to be stopped; (3) maintenance of safety conditions; (4) reasonable location of the checkpoint; (5) a reasonable time and duration of the checkpoint; (6) indicia of the official nature of the roadblock; (7) the length and nature of the detention; and (8) advance publicity regarding each checkpoint. (supra, at pp. 1341-47).  

                Subsequently, in People v. Banks (1993) 6 Cal.4th 926, the California Supreme Court revisited the sobriety checkpoint issue. In Banks, the Supreme Court considered whether advance publicity, which is one of the Ingersoll guidelines, was a constitutional prerequisite to the operation of a sobriety checkpoint. In addressing the issue, the court again emphasized that " 'federal constitutional principles require a showing of either the officer's reasonable suspicion that a crime has occurred or is occurring or, as an alternative, that the seizure is "carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers." [Citations.]' " (Banks, supra, at p. 936 emphasis added).  The Court concluded “that the operation of a sobriety checkpoint conducted in the absence of advance publicity, but otherwise in conformance with the guidelines we established in Ingersoll v. Palmer, supra, 43 Cal.3d 1321, 241 Cal.Rptr. 42, 743 P.2d 1299, does not result in an unreasonable seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” (Banks, supra at p. 949).  “As Ingersoll makes clear, sobriety checkpoints are constitutional so long as certain guidelines are followed. The eight factors identified in Ingersoll provide "functional guidelines" to assess the intrusiveness of a checkpoint”. (Roelfsema v. Department of Motor Vehicles  (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 871, 877, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 817, 820).

    In the case at bench, pursuant to Ingersol and Banks, it is the People’s burden to justify
the sobriety checkpoint pursuant to neutral and explicit guidelines.  For example, the People must show advance publicity.  Assuming that cannot be proven, there are seven other guidelines that must still be proven to justify the detention in the case at bench, and specifically, there are four areas that prove problematic for the People.  

    Were there limits on discretion of field officers?  “[M]otorists should not be subject to the unbridled discretion of the officer in the field as to who is to be stopped. Instead, a neutral formula such as every driver or every third, fifth or tenth driver should be employed.” (Ingersoll  at 1342).    
Second, whether the roadblock was in a reasonable location.  “The location of checkpoints should be determined by policy-making officials rather than by officers in the field. The sites chosen should be those which will be most effective in achieving the governmental interest; i.e., on roads having a high incidence of alcohol related accidents and/or arrests.”  (Ingersoll at p.1342).

     Was there indicia of the official nature of the roadblock?  “Those aspects of a sobriety roadblock which evidence its official nature are critical in minimizing its intrusiveness. The roadblock should be established with high visibility, including warning signs, flashing lights, adequate lighting, police vehicles and the presence of uniformed officers.
(Ingersoll  at p. 1321).

    Was the roadblock reasonable in time and duration? The Supreme Court observed that the average time each motorist was detained was "critical" to minimizing  the intrusiveness of the stop and justifying it as a proper administrative detention. ( Ingersoll at p. 1346)  “As a general proposition it seems to us entirely reasonable to require that a visitor not be kept waiting for search to commence more than 10 minutes from the time his or her vehicle is randomly selected to be searched.” Estes v. Rowland  (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 508, 529).  

    In the case at bench, these specific areas will need to be proven reasonable to justify the initial detention of the defendant. 
Conclusion

    For the foregoing reasons and authority, it is respectfully requested that the defendant’s motion to suppress be granted.

 

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